Introduction to Philosophy of Science
Lecture Notes

Lyle Zynda
Philosophy Department
Princeton University
Spring 1994

• Lecture 1 - Introduction
• Lecture 2 - The Inferential View Of Scientific Explanation
• Lecture 3 - The Causal Theory Of Explanation, Part I
• Lecture 4 - The Causal Theory Of Explanation, Part II
• Lecture 5 - The Causal Theory Of Explanation, Part III
• Lecture 6 - Problems with the Causal Theory Of Explanation
• Lecture 7 - Van Fraassen's Pragmatic View Of Explanation
• Lecture 8 - Carnap vs. Popper
• Lecture 9 - An Overview Of Kuhn's The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions
• Lecture 10 - Paradigms and Normal Science
• Lecture 11 - Anomaly, Crisis, and the Non-Cumulativity of Paradigm Shifts
• Lecture 12 - Incommensurability
• Lecture 13 - Laudan on Kuhn's Theory of Incommensurable Theories
• Lecture 14 - Laudan on the Hierarchical Model of Justification
• Lecture 15 - Laudan's Reticulated Theory of Scientific Justification
• Lecture 16 - Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change
• Lecture 17 - Scientific Realism Vs. Constructive Empiricism
• Lecture 18 - Inference To The Best Explanation As An Argument For Scientific Realism
• Lecture 19 - Entity Realism (Hacking & Cartwright)
• Lecture 20 - Entity Realism And The "Non-Empirical" Virtues
• Lecture 21 - Laudan on Convergent Realism
• Lecture 22 - Convergent Realism and the History of Science
• Lecture 23 - The Measurement Problem, Part I
• Lecture 24 - The Measurement Problem, Part II